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Abstract Explicit forms of rationing have already been implemented in some
countries, and many of these prioritization systems resort to Norman Daniels’
‘‘accountability for reasonableness’’ methodology. However, a question still
remains: is ‘‘accountability for reasonableness’’ not only legitimate but also fair?
The objective of this paper is to try to adjust ‘‘accountability for reasonableness’’ to
the World Health Organization’s holistic view of health and propose an evolu-
tionary perspective in relation to the ‘‘normal’’ functioning standard proposed by
Norman Daniels. To accomplish this purpose the authors depart from the ‘‘normal’’
functioning standard to a model that promotes effective opportunity for everyone in
health care access, because even within the ‘‘normal’’ functioning criteria some
treatments and medical interventions should have priority upon others. Equal
opportunity function is a mathematical function that helps to hierarchize moral
relevant necessities in health care according to this point of view. It is concluded,
first, that accountability for reasonableness is an extremely valuable tool to address
the issue of setting limits in health care; second, that what is called in this paper
‘‘equal opportunity function’’ might reflect how accountability for reasonableness
results in fair limit-setting decisions; and third, that this methodology must be
further specified to best achieve fair limit-setting decisions. Indeed, when resources
are especially scarce the methodology suggested in this paper might allow not only
prioritizing in an ‘‘all or nothing’’ basis but can contribute to a hierarchy system of
priorities in health care.
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Introduction
The majority of the developed countries try to associate economic growth with the
provision of certain social services and, in this manner, aim at progressively
improving the well-being of citizens. Accordingly, a social welfare model was
developed to guarantee that everyone had, among other things, access to health care
and education. However, with regards to health care a disproportionate growth of
the public expenditure in this sector was verified, for various motives, especially
population ageing. In 2010, 85.5 % of the health care expenditure in Norway was
supported by the tax payers, in Denmark 85.1 % and in the United Kingdom 83.2 %
[14]. This fact inevitably implies that limits have to be established for the public
provision of health care. Also in most developed countries, namely in OECD, the
proportion of total government expenditure that goes to health care is growing
steadily. Indeed, in 2010 health expenditure was in Norway 9.4 % of the GDP, in
Denmark 11.1 % and in the United Kingdom 9.6 % (medium of 9.5 % in OECD
countries).
With the establishment of priorities in health care a more effective adjustment is
possible between the demand and supply of health care. Explicit forms of rationing
have already been implemented in some countries, as is the case of the Scandinavian
countries, the Netherlands, England, Canada, among others, to improve the
management of the considerably high public health expenditure [2]. Many of these
prioritization systems resort to a proposal by Norman Daniels known as
‘‘accountability for reasonableness’’ [7], an indispensable tool to approach this
matter.
Nevertheless, if this method provides the required legitimacy to make decisions
regarding options in health care, the degree of fairness involved in these choices has
been questioned. In fact, Daniels bases his proposal on two presuppositions. Firstly,
that the health concept of the World Health Organization is too vast in order to
achieve the appropriate choices in health care. The second presupposition, which
follows from the latter, is that fairness in health care basically implies attaining a
‘‘normal’’ level of human performance; the citizens preferences that do not
correspond to the real health requirements do not need to be met.
The objective of this study is to try to adjust the ‘‘accountability for
reasonableness’’ to the World Health Organization’s holistic view of health and
propose an evolutionary method in relation to the ‘‘normal’’ functioning standard
proposed by Norman Daniels. Thus, the study will contribute to an even more just
and equitable prioritization system in health care.
Setting Limits in Health Care: From Legitimacy to Fairness
There are several solutions to overcome the problem of lack of sustainability in the
public health care systems, though the rationalization and efficiency measures
should not be neglected and should continue to be implemented. But, considering
the presupposition that the possibility of increasing the contributions in the form of
co-payments is very limited, the combination between efficiency and prioritization
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in health care has enabled the principle of equality, regarding the access to health
care by everyone, to be maintained in the developed countries. Therefore, in the
latter years, the establishment of priorities in health care has been considered in
many western countries regarding the reform of the public health care systems. The
citizens’ increasing needs, associated to ageing and the consequent demographic
inversion have led to a discrepancy between demand and supply in health care.
Accountability for reasonableness is probably the most widespread model of
priority setting in health care in the western world. In the United Kingdom, for
instance, accountability for reasonableness helped shape thinking about how the
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) should incorporate
social value judgments into its evidence based clinical proposals [27]. Indeed,
public health systems with public accountability, such as those of Canada, the
United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Sweden, are now explicitly applying this
framework of accountability for reasonableness [10, 13, 17]. In the universal
coverage systems of most developed countries such decisions are made by public
agencies. In mixed systems, such as in the United States, decisions whether to fund
new technologies—drugs, devices, procedures—are made both by public agencies
and by private insurers and managed care organisations.
Although the problem of formal (democratic and public) legitimacy is usually
guaranteed by accountability for reasonableness there still remains the problem of
substantive legitimacy that is if justice as fairness is really considered [26].
For instance with regards the National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence and other regulators that have direct impact on limit setting in health
care it has been overtly suggested that a more inclusive process might lead us to a
solution to the problem of substantive legitimacy. A decision-making process based
on inclusive deliberation as an accepted standard of decision-making by the overall
democratic society might add fairness to the system [30]. It follows that rational
decision-making cannot be achieved on the near-exclusive basis of quantitative
evidence and regulators should abide to communitarian traditions including most
ethical, moral and religious traditions.
Assuming that states in a pluralistic society are at least partially neutral—in the
sense that every perspective of human happiness has the same relative weight—
most regulators adopt a procedural approach to ethics not a substantive one [18].
And justice is more related to fair procedures and public accountability than to any
specific view of distribution of benefits and burdens. Indeed, a better framework for
prioritizing health care can be achieved through the inclusion of ethical traditions
that give more weight to features specific to particular persons, communities,
families and political units. In a secular pluralistic society it is desirable to channel
those different views of a good life resorting to democratic deliberation through
democratic institutions and to the direct empowerment of the people.
Qualitative evidence will only partially allow for procedural justice in health care
regulators’ deliberative process. This process in a democratic society should be
objective, comparable, accountable and externally evaluated. Evidence Based
Medicine (EBM) is in accordance with these principles, at a global level. This is the
reason why EBM is so appealing and a determinant factor in accountability for
reasonableness.
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As stated by Daniels and Sabin [7], public accountability means a robust
disclosure of relevant information about benefits and performance as well as a
demand for a due process. A specific array of conditions should be met to comply
with the principle of accountability [5–7], namely:
(a) Publicity condition: decisions regarding both direct and indirect limits to care
and their rationales must be publicly accessible;
(b) Relevance condition: The rationales for limit-setting decisions should aim to
provide a reasonable explanation of how the organization seeks to provide
‘‘value for money’’ in meeting the varied health needs for a defined population
under reasonable resource constraints. Specifically a rationale will be
reasonable if it appeals to evidence, reasons, and principles that are accepted
as relevant by fair-minded people who are disposed to finding mutually
justifiable terms of cooperation;
(c) Revision and appeals condition: There must be mechanisms for challenge and
dispute resolution regarding limit setting decisions, and, more broadly,
opportunities for revision and improvement of policies in the light of new
evidence or arguments;
(d) Regulative condition: There is either voluntary or public regulation of the
process to ensure that previous conditions are met.
This framework has as a genetic fingerprint both the deliberative process
necessary to establish the legitimacy of the decision-making process as well as the
fairness of such decisions [24]. Daniels claims that accountability for reasonable-
ness makes limit-setting decisions in health care not only legitimate, but also fair.
But what is really meant by fairness in limit-setting decisions?
Daniels argues that claims to equality of opportunity may be limited by scarcity
of resources, but nevertheless choices and priorities in health care must be
accountable by democratic procedures. This perspective of distributive justice as
well as its democratic accountability is responsible for the scope and limits of health
care services [5]. It follows that particular entitlements to health care—namely
expensive innovative treatments and medicines—may be fairly restricted as long as
this decision is socially accountable and imposed by financial restrictions of the
system [23]. This framework has been used, for instance, in rationing pharmaceu-
ticals in a accountable way [28] as the process facilitates a broader public discussion
about fair limit setting [9].
The starting point of Daniel’s account of fairness [3] is that ‘‘disease and
disability restricting the range of opportunities that would otherwise be open to
individuals’’ are properly seen as unjust and not only as unfortunate circumstances.
As this argument goes a right to health care access and delivery does exist as a
determinant to the exercise of the equal opportunity rule. This claim for an equal
opportunity of all citizens intends to ensure ‘‘normal’’ and not a truly ‘‘equal’’
functioning. This distinction seems to be paramount because each one of us is not
equal to a fellow citizen in the strict sense; in fact, we are entitled to some primary
goods that would allow us to function physically, psychologically and socially at a
basic level. Then, our talents and capacities, following our will, may be expressed or
not depending of particular circumstances. As a positive welfare right, the right to
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health care access and delivery imposes on society the duty to allocate resources to
health related needs with maximal efficiency.
This perspective is based on a health concept distinct from the World Health
Organization proposal since 1946. Concerning this aspect Norman Daniels refers
that ‘‘since we believe that health is a distinct concept from happiness, we also reject
the overly broad view of health as a ‘‘state of complete physical, mental, and social
well-being’’, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’’, that is embodied
in the World Health Organization definition [8].
By ‘‘normal’’ performance we mean the performance of the average citizen
(criterion of the reasonable person). The ‘‘excellent’’ or truly ‘‘equal’’ performance
is not the case since such a radical view of the citizens’ equal rights contradicts the
proper essence of the human diversity. That is, and according to Daniels, ‘‘we
correct for some ‘‘natural’’ effects on that distribution—disease and disability—but
we do not attempt to eliminate all differences in the name of a radically expansive
view of equal opportunity’’ [8].
The question then is how distributive decision-making in health care might gain
in fairness by giving wider representation to the diversity of perspectives in
contemporary western society. Specifically what is meant by ‘‘normal’’ functioning
or behaviour is itself a matter of controversy. This is the reason why the World
Health Organization definition of health is such a broad concept. On the other hand
there is no hierarchy in the provision of health when the standard is ‘‘normal’’ versus
‘‘non-normal’’ functioning. It is these authors’ conviction that even in the ‘‘normal’’
functioning criteria some treatments and medical interventions have priority upon
others.
Also, justice might be incremented with a progressive approach because in
principle every health service (treatment, diagnosis, and so on) might be negotiated
in the deliberative process. But fairness is also optimised because the confluence
between vertical and horizontal equity implies that, even within the basic package, a
progressive approach originates a true hierarchy of priorities meaning that a
particular treatment has precedence over another one, although the latter may still
be an integral part of the basic package.
Equal Opportunity Function: A Complementary Approach?
To enable a better compatibility between ‘‘accountability for reasonableness’’ and
the integrated view of health of the World Health Organization, the authors suggest
a change of paradigm regarding the referential ‘‘all or nothing’’ such as proposed by
Norman Daniels (‘‘normal’’ vs. ‘‘non-normal’’ functioning) [4]. Although the logical
consequence of justice as fairness being the implementation of an effective
opportunity for everyone to have access to health care and, thus, the issue being the
existence of a universal and general health system, its revaluation in the light of a
distributive justice may dictate a different future (Fig. 1).
Equal opportunities may be represented graphically in the form of a function:
(EO)F—equal opportunity function. This involves the convergence between the
concepts of vertical and horizontal equity. These concepts in their philosophical and
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economic scope do not specify the relevant properties to characterize an agent as
‘‘equal’’. This is to say, if equals should be treated in the same manner, with regards
to distribution of material resources, and others in an unequal manner, it is essential
to define a method which enables this distinction to be established. The graphic
representation of (EO)F, in the theoretical plan, resorts to two variables:
1. The X-axis represents the variable ‘‘hierarchy of needs’’ in accordance with the
Maslow pyramid (physiological, safety, belongingness and love, esteem, self-
actualization and self-transcendence needs);
2. The Y-axis indicates the health care performance level. This variable reaches a
maximum value through the universality and generality of the performance
(public services) and a minimum value in which the access to health care
services should be imputed to the individual responsibility of each citizen.
When the (EO)F intersects the X axis (Point EO*), in accordance with the
combination of: a) the ‘‘needs’’ criteria, and b) the financial restrictions imposed by
the system, appears the point from which the provision of health care through the
public services is not mandatory. From this point, any citizen may have access to
health care (at the cost of his own individual responsibility or the professional group
which he belongs to) without damaging the principle of justice as fairness, if he
resorts to alternative coverage schemes, namely private health insurance or out of
pocket payments. But, only if the fulfilment of the second order needs may be at
issue which may be situated, schematically, and in a variable form, as from the point
that Maslow defined as esteem needs (in comparison with the ‘‘normal’’ functioning
criteria—Fig. 2).
Norman Daniels establishes a distinction between ‘‘health need’’ and ‘‘health
preference’’, this means between the health care needs in order to reach a level of
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D: HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 
T: TIERING 
N: NEEDS (MASLOW) 
B&L: Belongingness and Love
S.A: Self-Actualization
S.T: Self-Transcendence 
Fig. 1 Equal opportunity function (EO)F. D health care delivery, T tiering, N needs (MASLOW), B&L
belongingness and love, S.A self-actualization, S.T self-transcendence
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functioning—physical and psychological—typical of our species, and mere
preferences, conveniences, which are beyond a reasonable and consensual level
of normality. Though it is not possible to satisfy all the esteem and self-actualization
needs, nor all the individual preferences, it is up to each person to resort to his
financial resources (individual responsibility) to achieve this objective. As from this
point EO*, and even though in an ideal society, with absolute availability of
resources in which these needs could be met, in the present state of economic and
financial restriction it is not only an option but, probably, a duty to proceed with this
priority. In practice, and presupposing a maximum efficiency of the public health
systems, the (EO)F allows the establishment of priorities in health care as far as the
health care services at issue aim at meeting the needs which do not interfere with the
normal performance of a citizen.
The universality of access is not subject to any objection but the claim that there
are no limits to public provision (having as major criteria the individual needs, by
definition, almost unlimited) is today contested since the allocation of society’s
resources to health has to compete with the supply of other social goods. Indeed, one
of the major challenges of modern societies is to converge economic development
with human development and therefore it has been overtly suggested that a true
developed society promotes every aspect of human fulfilment, such as health,
education, gender equality, and so on [15].
Inevitably a delicate balance emerges between the social goods which the
citizens may, or may not, be entitled to, in conformity with the social and economic
situation of a particular society. And as referred by Penelope Mullen and Peter
Spurgeon ‘‘the demand for health care is infinite and so rationing is inevitable’’, so
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Fig. 2 Equal opportunity function (EO)F—‘‘normal function’’ version. 1 ‘‘Normal function’’ curve. 2
‘‘WHO’’ curve
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In fact, inequality (treating two people in a different way) becomes an inequity
(treating two people in an unfair way) if a solid motive does not exist to justify the
negative discrimination of a citizen in detriment of another. However, the opposite
is equally valid, that is, an apparent inequity becomes a mere inequality (ethically
acceptable and, therefore, fair) if it is in conformity with the restrictions imposed on
the system with the application of the economic constraints in accordance with the
(EO)F. But if, and only if, that situation of inequality does not harm the citizens’
basic rights and, furthermore, if the process that led to the decision is democratically
determined in conformity with the public accountability criteria.
Reformulating this appreciation of the problem, the restrictions of an economic
and financial nature transform a decision for allocation of resources from iniquitous
(unfair) to acceptable (fair) as far as it does not negatively discriminate any class of
citizens; even though a particular class of services may be legitimately restricted.
This seems to be a huge dilemma of the health systems: to articulate in a fair and
impartial manner the right of access to the necessary health care using the resources
available in society [1, 29].
To illustrate this proposal we are going to refer to the application of equal
opportunity function on elective caesarean delivery. Evidence-based medicine
(EBM) has focused its attention on particular aspects of medicine, and specific
areas—such as elective on-demand caesarean delivery—were left behind because
there is some difficulty to perform this kind of EBM research [21]. Although there is
still no absolute evidence with regards the risk/benefit analysis of on-demand
caesarean delivery EBM must be carefully evaluated in this setting if adequate
health policies are to be promoted [25]. Evidence should be obtained by
international co-operation, by independent agencies, so that its goals are truly
achieved. This evidence is necessary so that a fair resource allocation policy is
accomplished. Indeed, even if it is accepted that there is a right to reproductive
autonomy—allowing a woman to make informed choices about the pregnancy and
birth—another issue is related to the social costs of this kind of decision. And,
therefore, it should be clearly determined if it should be included in the basic health
care package or if it should be left to individual responsibility.
From an ethical perspective on-demand caesarean delivery faces the problem of
justice in allocation of health care resources [31]. In a changing economic
environment it is not surprising that new approaches to health care may limit the
provision of care as it is not possible to deliver everything to everyone. As there is
no absolute evidence about the comparative risks and benefits of vaginal versus
abdominal deliveries, the authors will focus specifically in the relevance condition
as far as the rational and the reasons and principles for limit-setting decisions are
concerned. Indeed, choices and priorities in health care are fair if they are
accountable by democratic procedures.
Norman Daniels states quite clearly that ‘‘In any health care system, then, some
choices will have to be made by a fair, publicly accountable, decision-making
process. Just what constitutes a fair decision-making procedure for resolving moral
disputes about health care entitlements is itself a matter of controversy. It is a
problem that has been addressed little in the literature. Our rights are not violated,
however, if the choices that are made through fair decision-making procedures turn
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out to be ones that do not happen to meet our personal needs, but instead meet needs
of others that are judged more important’’ [4]. This perspective of distributive
justice as well as its democratic accountability is responsible for the scope and
limits of health care services. It follows that particular entitlements to health care—
namely access to a particular type of delivery in a public service—may be fairly
restricted as long as this decision is socially accountable and imposed by financial
restrictions of the system.
In many countries, for instance, upper and middle-class women choose regularly
abdominal deliveries when having babies since they can afford to pay for it in
private clinics. In the private health care system, where women come from higher
income and education levels, caesarean delivery prevails. On the other hand, in the
public sector, where women belong to less privileged social classes, vaginal
deliveries are the usual practice due to medical care routines that are imposed on
them.
As far as the rational and the reasons for limit setting is concerned, and although
in principle, the pregnant woman’s reproductive autonomy should be respected (see
for instance the 2011 NICE’s guideline that states that ‘‘For women requesting a CS,
if after discussion and offer of support … a vaginal birth is still not an acceptable
option, offer a planned CS’’ [22]), Daniels’ relevance condition implies that a
thorough economic analysis is performed. It follows that restrictions to the basic
package in health care imply necessarily that the competitive medical treatment (on-
demand caesarean delivery) is more expensive than the usual one (vaginal delivery).
If the price is the same or lower then there is no reason based on fairness to restrict
its use in public services (although it might be restricted by a risk/benefit analysis).
This economic analysis should take into consideration not only direct costs but also
indirect ones. In caesarean versus vaginal delivery it is usually considered only the
unitary price of each procedure as determined by each country health authority (or
insurance company). In general the unitary price reflects mainly the aggregated
costs of the professionals, the operating room and the materials used. This analysis
may be biased because the cost of a caesarean delivery is usually calculated for
caesareans performed with medical indications (crash caesareans for instance)
which tend to be much more expensive than caesarean on-demand, that are planned
and elective.
Indeed most reports show that the cost of caesarean delivery is higher than
vaginal birth. Therefore, it can be claimed that the practical application of the equal
opportunity function can place caesarean delivery in the T segment (tiering) of the
Y-axis that is outside the basic health care package. It follows that public health care
systems have the responsibility of promoting good quality Planned Parenthood
services but some interventions—such as on-demand caesarean delivery—may be
legitimately positioned outside the basic package [19]. Although pregnancy and
birth is in accordance with Daniels’ ‘‘normal’’ functioning and therefore it is a
health need not a mere preference, the proposed methodology—equal opportunity
function—allows that in this circumstance a fairer decision-making process is
obtained. On the other hand if, in the future, it is technically demonstrated that the
cost of vaginal birth is higher than that of a caesarean delivery a straightforward
application of the equal opportunity function might led to the conclusion that CS
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might be included in the basic package. The (EO)F curve then has a great elasticity
with regard the amount of services available to all citizens allowing to fairly adjust
the basic package to the amount of resources available.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that health systems must be explicit about prioritizing and
Norman Daniels’ theory of justice and health is the most widespread tool to
accomplish this goal. However, it faces a practical problem that is how to allocate
resources fairly when they are especially scarce. Daniels claims that accountability
for reasonableness makes limit-setting decisions in health care not only legitimate,
but also fair.
This paper assesses the latter claim. Does accountability for reasonableness result
in fair limit-setting decisions? The paper discusses different options for resolving
this lack of clarity and examines how they apply to Daniels’ accountability for
reasonableness framework. In general this theory holds that treatments that
accomplish a species typical behaviour (normal) should be in the basic package and
that this is accepted by reasonable people. And therefore a treatment that does not
relate to a health need, but only to an individual preference, should be left outside
[11]. Our proposal offers an evolution from this perspective. For instance pre
implantation genetic diagnosis is not—strictly speaking—essential for the normal
function of a person. Nevertheless, if there are enough resources available this
method of diagnosis could still be offered to the general public. It would depend
contingently on the balance reached by the social contract between the global
amount of resources and the public services desired. It follows that the (EO)F curve
is not static but slides to the left or to the right depending of particular social
arrangements. It means that in principle with growing resources more health
services could be in the basic package ((EO)F curve to the right) and in a period of
scarcity the amount of health services is shorter ((EO)F curve to the left).
And what about prioritizing treatments that originate a species typical (normal)
behaviour but that are more expensive than less expensive alternatives (such as on-
demand caesarean section, some medical assisted procreation technologies, some
blood alternatives or snoring surgery in non-pathological cases)? Moreover, does
the traditional framework of ‘‘accountability for reasonableness’’ help to prioritize
pharmaceuticals of proven medical benefit but extremely expensive in a just and fair
way [12, 16]? Moreover, how far should society be involved in these decisions so
that they are legitimate and fair [32]?
It can be claimed that applying the WHO definition of health in priority setting
would allow access to a wider range of health care, without violating the four
conditions underlying ‘‘accountability for reasonableness’’. Indeed, publicity,
revision and appeals, and regulative conditions are mainly procedural ones but
are extremely useful in legitimating health care choices applying the ‘‘equal
opportunity function’’. On the other hand the relevance condition might even be
optimized with this rationale because it can be claimed that not only a ‘‘reasonable
explanation’’ but a ‘‘fair explanation’’ is given of how value for money is optimized.
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Namely in the European tradition equal opportunity function appeals to evidence,
reasons, and principles that might be accepted as fair by most citizens. The
Manchester Triage System (MTS) is a practical example of the equal opportunity
function at a micro level. From a justice perspective the MTS algorithm implies that
more fundamental needs (such as protecting life) have priority over less
fundamental ones, although these might also be considered. At a macro level the
equal opportunity function could be not only fairer but also more practical because
it would also allow a more equitable managing of waiting lists, if the reasons and the
rationale for choices are made public and are truly accountable.
It is concluded, first, that ‘‘accountability for reasonableness’’ is an extremely
valuable tool to address the issue of setting limits in health care; second, that what is
called ‘‘equal opportunity function’’ can reflect how ‘‘accountability for reason-
ableness’’ results in fair limit-setting decisions; and third, that this methodology
must be further specified to best achieve fair limit-setting decisions. Indeed, when
resources are especially scarce the methodology suggested in this paper will allow
not only prioritizing in an ‘‘all or nothing’’ basis but can contribute to a more
systematic and fair approach. It might even be considered as an evolutionary
perspective in relation to Daniels’ account of fairness. In developed societies most
citizens are aware of the need to establish priorities in health care but there is a
strong disagreement about the ethical legitimacy of many choices. The ‘‘normal’’
functioning standard’ suggested by Norman Daniels is very appealing because the
‘‘reasonable and prudent’’ person can easily determine what services should be
included in the basic package. But this standard may leave important modalities of
diagnosis and treatment outside public services. The equal opportunity function
evolves from this perspective in the sense that keeping in mind that a distinction
should be made with regard the treatments that may or not be included in the basic
package it allows a gradual approach and a true hierarchic system of priorities in
health care.
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